Certainly, things are going Ferguson's way. Chelsea aren't at their best, his correct but controversial decision to offload Ruud van Nistelrooy has been emphatically vindicated, and old friends like Paul Scholes, Ole Solskjaer and, in particular, Ryan Giggs are playing better than anybody could reasonably have expected. But what Ferguson really needs is an even older friend by his side: 4-4-2.

For the last five years Ferguson has been increasingly sniffy towards 4-4-2, preferring umpteen variations on 4-5-1 in a bid to go the extra mile in Europe. The problem is that he has taken United backwards both domestically and overseas. And never can the argument for going back to the future have been more compelling than at Wigan last week. In the first half United played 4-5-1, with Wayne Rooney on the left wing, and were disjointed and deservedly a goal down. In the second half, with Rooney back up front and Ryan Giggs on in a 4-4-2, they murdered Wigan with a wonderful performance of passing, movement and freedom. They were partying like it was 1999 all over again.

The choice is a no-brainer to everyone, it seems, except Ferguson and his much-maligned assistant, serial failure Carlos Queiroz. Playing 4-5-1 with this collection of players is like putting a suit on a slacker: observers realise it is painfully inappropriate, protagonists feel self-conscious and constricted. They simply can't be themselves.The switch is all part of Ferguson's bid to bring continental sophistication to the club, but the suspicion remains that, for whatever reason, Queiroz is the one pulling the strings. When United sneaked an undeserved 1-0 win in injury-time against Liverpool at Old Trafford last season, Queiroz beamed proudly that "our intention was to score one goal". It was a chilling insight into the ethos of the new United. And it is completely flawed: British footballers - and Ferguson's teams will always have a British core - just cannot do cute and crafty. Most probably think catenaccio is an exotic dish. Asking them to play that way is like asking Kelly Brook to star in Amelie.

In a sense, the state of mind, the catenaccio, is even more important than the formation. United's current take on 4-5-1 is almost identical to Barcelona's: a multi-faceted, perpetual motion striker, two of the world's brightest talents roaming from the wings, with an enforcer and two passers in midfield. But the devil is in the detail: Ronaldinho never bothers to defend in what is a genuine 4-3-3; Rooney often ends up at left-back in what is undeniably 4-5-1. By the same token, United played 4-4-2 against Arsenal last month but were so meek and deferential that it was only a matter of time before they conceded. United are just no good at trying to play cagey and pickpocket teams; they need to go for broke from the off and to hell with the consequences. Besides, it's high time Rio Ferdinand started earning his wages.

It is a dangerous thing to mess with the DNA of a football club. Arsène Wenger did it for the good, overturning the image of Arsenal, but very few others have managed it successfully. And certain clubs - United, Barcelona, Real Madrid, Ajax, West Ham - have values that are passed down through generations, not to be compromised. Ask Dave Sexton. To most people in football he is one of the most erudite coaches English football has ever produced. To Manchester United fans he is a villain, the scholar who tried to impose defensive football on United and became reviled as a consequence. The fact that Ferguson is now often referred to as Sir Alex Sexton says it all.

It was not always so, of course. Around the turn of the century United played some of the most thrillingly, quintessentially British football imaginable: a furious concoction of skill and strength that very few clubs could live with. But the events of April 19 2000 changed everything. Ferguson was hit brutally hard by the defeat to Real Madrid that stripped United of their European crown. After a 0-0 draw in the first leg, United were picked off at Old Trafford, going 3-0 down before saving face at 3-2. Ferguson swore blind that, had United been cuter tactically, they'd have gone through.

But they should have gone through anyway. United absolutely battered Madrid in that game - Iker Casillas made five outstanding saves; Raimond van der Gouw hardly touched the ball except to pick it out of the net - but something in Ferguson died that day, chiefly his belief in swash and buckle, and his sense that it was time to fundamentally change United's modus operandi was confirmed a year later when, again playing 4-4-2, they were quietly battered by Bayern Munich in the quarter-finals. There is compelling evidence, however, to suggest that that defeat was more attributable to the declining effectiveness of his forwards, Dwight Yorke and Andy Cole, rather than the declining effectiveness of 4-4-2.

Either way, Fergie would not be shaken, and in came Juan Sebastian Veron and a switch to 4-5-1. In a bid to justify such a fundamental change, he has tried every single variation on that basic formation over a five-year period. At first the changes were ostensibly minor, with Scholes replacing Yorke as the drop-off striker, but it meant that he could drop into midfield at every opportunity and give United nine behind the ball. It was a disaster: United lost 10 games before Christmas and, even more significantly, their aura of omnipotence. Only a switch to a full-on 4-4-2, with Van Nistelrooy and Solskjaer up front, almost rescued their season.

In 2002-03, Scholes and Van Nistelrooy had the seasons of their life, and 4-4-1-1 was an undoubted success as United romped home in the Premiership. It was no coincidence, however, that United's electric surge in the final months came at the same moment Veron got injured, and forced Ferguson to go back to a higher-tempo game.

Then, with Europe in mind, Fergie switched again to 4-2-3-1, bringing in an extra defensive midfielder (Phil Neville) to ape the formation used by the Real Madrid side that ransacked United in the quarter-finals the previous season. After a miserable campaign, he shifted again in 2004-05, this time to 4-3-2-1, with an extra pair of legs to keep Roy Keane in the team, before switching back to 4-4-2 when Keane left. The moment Ferguson did, United went on a storming run that almost hauled in Chelsea. It cannot be a coincidence. Seven titles in nine years with 4-4-2; one in five with 4-5-1. Next stop, rocket science.